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THE LAW OF DEFAMATION: PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM
By R CHARD C. DONNELLY*
THE anomalous and haphazard history of the law of defama.
ion has led to the survival until the present day of two torts-
libel and slander-dealing with what is essentially an invasion of
the same interest, namely, the interest in reputation and good
name. The law of slander has undergone little substantive change
since the dose of the 17th century and the foundations for libel
were laid in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.' As early as
1812, Lord Mansfield deplored the distinction based upon mere
form and proceeded to explode the reasons for its continuance
but conceded that the schism was too well established to be re-
pudiated.2 Many able legal scholars have broken lances with this
branch of the law but with little success.3 Notwithstanding the
fierce criticism of this enfant terrible of the law it has been the
stepchild of reform, generally unwanted and unnoticed. Two recent
events are of particular interest to students of this subject: (1)
The Defamation Act prepared by the Canadian Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in 1944, which has
been adopted in two provinces;' and (2) the Report of the Com-
mittee on the Law of Defamation, "Presented by the Lord High
Chancellor to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, October,
1948." 5 It is proposed in this article to examine some of the results
of these two events, to compare the state of American law, and to
make certain recommendations.
*Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Virginia.
1. For the history of defamation consult Veeder, History md Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 3 Col. L. Rev. 546 (1903), and 4 Col. L. Rev.
33 (1904); Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L. Q. Rev. 255, 388(1904), Holdsworth, Defamatiom m the Sixteenth and Seventcecnth Cen-
turies, 40 L. Q. Rev. 302, 397 (1924), and 41 L. Q. Rev. 13 (1925), Restate-
ment, Torts § 568, comment b (1938).
2. Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 366, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (C.P
1812), "If the matter were for the first time to be decided at this day, I
should have no hesitation m saying, that no action could be maintained for
written scandal which could not be maintained for the words if they had been
spoken."
3. Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L.
Rev. 552 (1902) ; Prosser, Handbook on Torts 777, 807 (1941).
4. Manitoba in 1946 (Man. c. 11 1946) and Alberta in 1947 (Alta.
c. 14 1947).
5. Report of the Committee on the Law of Defamation, Cmd. 7536
(1948), hereafter cited as "Report." This document may be obtained from
the British Information Service, Rockefeller Plaza, New York, for 35c.
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ASSIMILATION OF LIBEL AND SLANDER
The methods and techniques of mass communications have been
urged in support of the view that the distinction between libel and
slander should be discarded.6 Modern inventions such as radio and
television have made it increasingly difficult to draw the line be-
tween the two, yet drawing the line is of great practical importance
for recovery frequently depends upon the classification adopted.
Whereas all libels are actionable without proof of actual pecuniary
loss, the plaintiff in an action for slander must prove that he has
suffered special damage as a direct result of the slander unless the
words fall within certain limited and somewhat arbitrarily defined
categories of abuse that are slanderous per se.
7
The Committee on the Law of Defamation is opposed to gen-
eral assimilation although it admits that the bifurcation is arbitrary
and illogical.8 Slander is often trivial, frequently good-tempered,
is normally not taken seriously by speaker or listener, and, in the
great majority of cases, does little or no harm. If all slander were
made actionable per se the opportunity for trivial but costly liti-
gation would be enormously increased. The rule requiring proof
of special damage, while resting upon no logical basis or principle,
is a satisfactory compromise giving adequate protection in the
common run of cases while avoiding the encouragement of petty
complaints.
The Canadian Defamation Act, on the other hand, creates a
6. Paton, Reform and the English Law of Defamation, 33 Ill. L. Rev.
669 (1939) , Donnelly, Defamation by Radio" A Reconsderation, 34 Iowa L.
Rev. 12 (1948).
7 Prosser, Handbook on Torts 793 (1941)
8. Report, 1111 33-41. The Committee recognized that under the law of
Scotland all statements which would be actionable in written form are
equally actionable if spoken. It conceded that no serious disadvantages have
resulted from this unity, nor any excessive litigation but concluded that the
development and historical background of English law is so different from
the Scots that the experience of the latter could not be translated. Two
members of the Committee dissented, favoring the assimilation of the law
of slander with that of libel. The dissenters thought that no adequate reason
now exists for perpetuating a distinction which originated by an accident
of English legal history. They point out that for more than 100 years there
has been a substantial body of legal opinion in favor of assimilation. Report,
ff 40.
One writer has made the point that the difference between Scots and
the English law on this score is due not so much to differences of source
as to the fact that Scots courts steadily focused attention upon the nature
of the injury sustained and did not become obsessed with drawing fine
distinctions and juggling artificial principles and technical rules. Normand,
Law of Defamation in Scotland, 6 Camb. L. J. 327 (1938). Also see Gloag




new tort of "defamation" which includes both libel and slander
and all defamatory publications are made actionable without proof
of damage.'
In Louisiana, alone of our states, all defamation whether oral
or written is actionable without proof of damage and the assimila-
tion has apparently been administered without undue difficulty. 10
At least four proposals" have been made for the assimilation
of libel and slander: (1) To merge libel into slander and require
in all cases proof of actual damage as essential to the existence of
a cause of action.1 2 Tis alternative has been popular with news-
paper publishers because it would definitely limit the scope and
availability of the action. (2) At the other end of the spectrum is
the proposal that all defamation be actionable without proof of
damage. 3 As we have seen, this is the state of affairs in Scotland,
Louisiana, and under the Canadian Uniform Act.14 Opponents of
this solution argue that opportunities for extortionate suits are in-
creased, that much slander is trivial, harmless, and unworthy of
redress; and that the interest in freedom of speech requires that
some safety-valve be left open for the expression of unflattering
but volatile views. (3) Another proposal is to abandon the dis-
tinction based upon form but to distinguish between major and
minor defamatory imputations. The English Press Union Bill,
which was introduced in Parliament in 1938 but failed of passage,
was of this tenor. It took the narrow law of slander as its model
and would have made proof of actual damage an essential to re-
covery, even in the case of libel, save in a few specified cases."
Libel would not have been actionable without proof of special dam-
age unless the words complained of imputed sexual immorality,
drunkenness or cruelty; charged the plaintiff with having com-
mitted an offense punishable by imprisonment; contained an im-
putation that the plaintiff was afflicted with an obnoxious con-
tagious disease; or were published of the plaintiff in relation to his
9. Alta. c. 14, §§ 2, 3 (1947), Man. c. 11, §§ 2, 3 (1946).
10. Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389 (1839), Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40
La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888), Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17
So. 422 (1895). A similar merger has taken place in the criminal law. La.
Code Crim. Law & Proc. Ann. §§ 740-47 (1943).
11. Prosser, Handbook on Torts 808 (1941).
12. This position is taken by Courtney, supra note 3. See Thorley v.
Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 366, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (C.P 1812).
13. Carr, supra note 1, at 388, Veeder, The History apd Theory of the
Law of Defamation., 4 Col. L. Rev. 33, 54, 56 (1904), Paton, stpra note 6.
14. See notes 9, 10, 11 supra.
15. Paton, supra note 6. For the full text of the Press Union Bill see
Note, 85 L. J. 440 (1938).
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office, profession or trade or in relation to his conduct in the per-
formance of a public duty But the fixed categories of slander per
se now found in the law of slander have been far from successful
and the substitution of new but similar classifications has ques-
tionable value. (4) A final proposal is to use the extent of publi-
cation as a basis of classification.'0 Thus, defamation published in a
newspaper or on the radio, because of its greater potentialities for
harm, might well be actionable without proof of special damage
while a private letter or conversation might not. This method seems
more reasonable than the present attempt to draw a line between
written and oral communicationY.
7
Radio broadcasting has been the form of communication that
has rendered the distinction between libel and slander obsolete.
Aural aggressions transmitted over the radio may reach an audi-
ence of many millions and will cause, much, if not more, damage
than a newspaper article however large its circulation. A radio
listener usually does not know whether the words he hears are
read from a manuscript or spoken extemporaneously, and it is of
little consequence to him whether they were written or oral in their
inception. In this country, however, it is generally held that if the
words are read from a manuscript they are classified as libel but
if spoken extemporaneously they are slander.' 8 The legislatures
of a few states have attempted to deal with the problem but they
have not followed a consistent pattern, some branding defamatory
broadcasts libel and some slander.19
The Committee on the Law of Defamation forthrightly recom-
mends that all defamatory statements transmitted over the radio
or by television be treated as libels and actionable without proof
of special damage.20 Of course, the general assimilation of libel and
slander under the Canadian Act includes radio broadcasting.
16. Prosser, Handbook on Torts 809 (1941)
17 The Canadian Act, for example, contains certain sections applying
specially and exclusively to newspapers and broadcasting stations. Alta. c. 14,
§§ 13-18 (1947), Man. c. 11, §§ 13-18 (1946)
18. Donnelly, supra note 6, at 14-18.
19. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 46 (Supp. 1947) and Cal. Pen. Code §
258 (1941) (slander), N. C. Rev. Code §§ 12-2815 (1943) (making
"Slander by means of the radio" a criminal offense) , Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38.
§§ 404.1-404.4 (1945) (libel) , Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 23-437 (19,19)
(making radio broadcasting of "false and scandalous matter, with intent
to injure or defame" a misdemeanor) , Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 2424,
2427 (Supp. 1940) (making radio broadcasting subject to criminal libel
laws)
20. Report, liii 42, 43.
[ Vol. 33 :609
DEFAMATION
INADVERTENT LIBEL
The great weight of authority in England2' and the United
States22 is to the effect that the publisher of a newspaper, book, or
periodical is strictly liable for the defamatory matter he prints.
Whether radio stations are to be held to the same liability is in a
state of confusion and statutes have not been consistent.2 3 The effect
of strict liability is to make the printing of words an ultrahazardous
activity-the defendant publishes at his peril unless he can estab-
lish the narrow defense of privilege. This doctrine has not gone
without criticism and a few successful attacks have been made
upon it.24 While it is true that strict liability affords opportunities
to the unscrupulous to bring extortionate suits it has been sup-
ported on the ground that the power of the press to destroy the
reputation of an individual is so great as to make strict rules neces-
sary -;25 that the rule checks undesirable journalism -;26 that suffi-
cient protection is afforded by the rule that permits evidence of
good faith in mitigation of damages ;.- and that the press can pro-
tect itself through insurance or indemnity provisions in its con-
21. Hultan & Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K. B. 444. aff'd, [1910] A. C. 20;
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, [1929] 2 K. B. 331, Newstead v.
London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1940] 1 K. B. 377
22. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1909), Milani v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 185 S. C. 194, 193 S. E. 324 (1937), Corrigan v.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58, 126 N. E. 260 (1920) ; Restatement, Torts
§§ 5634, 579-80 (1938).
23. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
Donnelly, supra note 6, at 19-28, Note, Defamation by Radio, 32 Va. L.
Rev. 612 (1947).
Statutes in Florida and Washington insulate the station from liability
where the speaker departs from a prepared script. Fla. Stat. § 770.03 (1941),
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 998-1 (Supp. 1943). Iowa and Oregon make the
exercise of due care a good defense. Iowa Code § 659.5 (1946), Ore. Laws
1941, c. 303.
24. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933), but cf.
Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 161 F 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947)
limiting the doctrine of the Layne case; Clare v. Farrell, 70 F Supp. 276
(D. Minn. 1947), noted in 35 Calif. L. Rev. 462 (1947), Summit Hotel Co.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939), Kelly v.
Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143 (N.J. Ct Err. & App. 1948); Prosser, Handbook
on Torts 818 (1941).
Even under the majority rule of strict liability the defendant may show
in mitigation of damages his good faith. Broadfoot v. Bird, 217 App. Div.
325, 216 N. Y. Supp. 670 (3d Dep't 1926), Gill v. Ruggles. 95 S. C. 90, 78
S. E. 536 (1913), Pfister v. Milwaukee Free Press Co., 139 Wis. 627, 121
N. W 938 (1909) ; McCormick, Handbook on Damages 438 (1935).
25. Paton, supra note 6, at 670.
26. Note, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 295 (1941).
27 -McDonald v. Woodrull, Fed. Cas. No. 8770 (E.D. Ark. 1871);
Broadfoot v. Bird, 217 App. Div. 325, 216 N. Y. Supp. 670 (3d Dep't 192-6),
Gill v. Ruggles, 95 S. C. 90, 78 S. E. 536 (1913) , Pfister v. Milwaukee




tracts.2" Furthermore, the media of mass communications are usual-
ly large industrial enterprises organized for profit and are more
strategically placed than their victims to absorb and distribute
losses.
A common law palliative for a libel defendant is a full, fair, and
unequivocal retraction which usually precludes the recovery of
punitive damages 9 and can be shown in mitigation of general
damages. 30 At least twenty states 1 have enacted statutes providing
28. Jewett Publishing Co. v. Butler, 159 Mass. 517, 34 N. E. 1087
(1893), Donnelly, supra note 6, at 21.
29. In a defamation action the jury may consider three kinds of dan-
ages special, general, and punitive. Special damages refer to a specific and
pecuniary loss which the plaintiff has sustained, such as the loss of a job.
General damages include such elements of harm as injury to reputation,
general loss of trade or business, wounded feelings, physical pain and illness
resulting from injury to the feelings, and estimated future damages of the
same sort. Where the defendant's conduct has been particularly outrageous
or "malicious" the jury may award the plaintiff a windfall by way of "smart
money" called "punitive" or "exemplary" damages. McCormick, Handbook
on Damages 443-445 41935)
30. Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N. D. 568, 178 N. W 792 (1920)
Fessinger v. El Paso Times Co., 154 S. W 1171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
McCormick, Handbook on Damages 438 (1935) If a retraction is not full
and complete and published in a proper spirit it may do the person defamed
more harm than good. An example of this is Luna v. Seattle Times Co..
186 Wash. 618, 59 P 2d 753 (1936) The fullness and adequacy of a
retraction is for the court inasmuch as the construction of a writing is in-
volved but the weight to be given the retraction in mitigation is for the
jury. Harper, Torts 524 (1935) The retraction must be given the same
prominence as the original statement. Williams v. McManus, 38 La. An.
161 (1886), Storey v Wallace, 60 Ill. 51 (1871), Kent v. Bonzey. 38
Maine 435 (1854). An offer to publish the statement of the person defamed
will not mitigate damages. Coffman v Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co.. 65
Wash. 1, 117 Pac. 596 (1911), Constitution Pub. Co. v. Way, 94 Ga. 120.
21 S. E. 139 (1894), Evening Post Pub. Co. v. Voight, 72 Fed. 885. 888
(2d Cir. 1896)
A refusal to retract when requested to do so may be shown by the
plaintiff as evidence of malevolence or improper purpose in publishing the
original statement. Reid v. Nichols, 166 Ky. 423. 179 S. W 440 (1915)
Crane v. Bennett, 177 N. Y 106, 69 N. E. 274 (1904) , Wallace v. Jameson,
179 Pa. 98, 98 Atl. 142 (1897), INote, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 867 (1922)
A retraction is not regarded as a complete reparation inasmuch as it
may not reach the same people who read the offending article. Perrett v.
New Orleans Times Newspaper, 25 La. Ann. 170 (1873) Consequently ajury must consider both the original article and the retraction in its deter-
mination of the net damage sustained by the plaintiff. Webb v. Call Pub.
Co., 173 Wis. 45, 180 N. W 263 (1920)
A retraction may also be used to show that the plaintiff has suffered less
than he claims in the way of actual damage to his reputation. Webb v. Call
Pub. Co., 173 Wis. 45, 180 N. W 263 (1920) , White v. Sun Pub. Co.,
164 Ind. 426, 73 N. E. 890 (1905) And where privilege is in question it
may be evidence of the defendant's good intentions and worthy motives from
which the jury may conclude that the privilege has not been abused. Note,
35 Harv. L. Rev. 867, 870 (1922)
31. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 913-916 (1940) , Cal. Civ. Code § 48a
(1941) , Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5688 (1930) , Del. Laws (1943), c. 177, § 1 (a),
Fla. Stat. § 770.02 (1941) , Ga. Code Ann. §§ 105-713 (Supp. 1947) . Ind.
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that a retraction may be introduced in evidence by the defendant
in mitigation of damages. An evaluation of this type of legislation
is made difficult by two factors (1) legislative vagueness and (2)
judicial hostility. Instead of limiting recovery in the event of a
retraction to "special" or "general" damages-the adjectives hav-
ing a rather definite connotation-most statutes use the term
"actual" damages. They fall into two general groups (1) Those
where the term "actual" damages is defined or construed by the
courts to mean non-punitive damages, and (2) those where the
term is used or the courts have construed it to mean special dam-
ages only. If the statute falls within the first category it makes no
change in the common law rule for the effect of a retraction is
merely to preclude the recovery of punitive damages.3 - If the statute
is of the second type it is likely to encounter constitutional diffi-
culties as depriving the plaintiff of a "property right" in his
name;33 as depriving him of "due course of law and justice ad-
-ministered without delay" ;34 or as class legislation in favor of the
Ann. Stat. §§ 2-1043 (Burns 1933), Iowa Code §§ 659.2-4 (1946), Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 411.050 (1946); Mie. Rev. Stat. c. 100, § 48 (1944), 'Mass. Ann.
Laws, c. 231, § 93 (Supp. 1947), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.1373 (Henderson
1938), 2 Minn. Stat. § 548.06 (1945), N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2.59-2 (1939);
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 99.1-3 (1943), N. D. Rev. Code § 14-0208 (1943),
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 11343 (1938) , Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1446a (1941),
S. D. Code § 47.0504 (1939), Tex. Stat. § 5431 (1936), Utah Code Ann.
§ 62-2-1 (1943) ; Va. Code Ann. § 6240a (1942), Wis. Stat. § 331.05 (1947).
The statutes are collected in Arthur and Crosman, The Law of Newspapers
500-578 (1940) and Angoff, Handbook of Libel (1946).
32. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 164 (1947), .Morns,
Inadvertent Libel and Retraction, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1937).
33. Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co. 45 N. D. 568, 178 N. W 792 (1920),
"These damages to a person's reputation are in the nature of a property
right; they have been said to constitute property." The court then held the
statute constitutional insofar as it merely eliminated punitive danmages. On
the latter point, it is generally held that there is no constitutional objection
to the elimination of punitive damages as they do not constitute a "property
right." Comer v. Age Herald Pub. Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907),
Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811 (1904), Neafie v. Hoboken
Printing & Publishing Co., 75 N. J. L. 564, 68 Atl. 146 (1907), Kelly v. Hall,
191 Ga. 470, 12 S. E. 2d 881 (1941).
34. The Kansas Bill of Rights (§ 18) provides that all "persons for
injuries suffered in person, reputation or property shall have remedy by
due course of law and justice administered without delay." The Kansas
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041, said that
"general damages" are not merely speculative but "ire such injuries to the
reputation as were contemplated in the bill of rights." The Court also held
that a retraction is not an ample substitute for "due course of law." See
also Park v. Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W 731 (1888).
A similar Minnesota statute was upheld in Allen v. Pioneer Press, 40
Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, but the Minnesota court in a later decision would
seem to have practically emasculated the statute by applying it only to cases
where the defendant was not negligent. Thorson v. Albert Lea Publishing
Co., 190 Minn. 200, 251 N. W 177 (1933).
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press.35 In fact, Professor Morris concludes, after an excellent
and thorough analysis of retraction statutes, 3 that "the important
point is that in jurisdictions where this type of legislation is in
effect and has been interpreted, the sum total of significant changes
in the measure of damages when inadvertent libel has been re-
tracted is zero." A few states have extended their retraction statutes
to include radio and television37 but there is no reason for believing
that these extensions will be received with greater favor by tile
courts than the ones limited to newspapers.
The Canadian Defamation Act3" limits the plaintiff to a re-
covery of special damages where the defamation was published ii
good faith and retracted by the newspaper or broadcasting station
before the commencement of suit.
The Committee on the Law of Defamation has taken a drastic
step in regard to inadvertent libel. The Committee refused to
follow the suggestions of a number of witnesses that an uninten-
tional and non-negligent defamatory publication not be actionable
at all. It did recommend, however, that where the defendant takes
reasonable precautions before publication to ascertain whether or
not the statement is defamatory, the plaintiff should be restricted
to demanding the publication of a correction and apology, and,
if a correction and apology are published no damages at all should
be recoverable."' In the event the parties cannot agree upon the
form and manner of publishing the correction and apology the
Committee recommends that either party be authorized to apply
to a High Court Judge sitting in chambers whose decision as to
the form of the correction and apology and the manner in which
it is to be published shall be final and not appealable. 0 It should be
noted that the defendant must have exercised reasonable care in
ascertaining that the statement was not defamatory of the plain-
tiff. The Committee ducked the important question of whether the
plaintiff or the defendant should have the onus of proof." Inas-
much as the facts upon which reasonable belief should be based and
35. Park v. Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W 731 (1888)
"It is not competent for the legislature to give one class of citizen legal
exemptions from liability for wrongs not granted to others." For the con-
trary view see Allen v. Pioneer Press, 41 Minn. 117, 41 N. W 936 (1889),
and Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 126, 130 (1929).
36. Morris, supra note 32, at 42.
37 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 48a (1941) , Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-518 (Burns.
Supp. 1937) N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99-2a (1943)
38. \lta. c. 14, § 17 (1947), Man. c. 11, § 17 (1926)
39. Report, 1111 62-66.
40. Report, IT 67
41. Report, IT 73.
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the precautions that were in fact taken are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant it would appear that the burden should
be upon him. The plaintiff should be permitted to salvage this
much from the drastic change proposed.
In tlus country there would be considerable doubt as to the
constitutionality of a statute incorporating the suggestions of the
Committee.4 2
TRUTH
For a long period in English law truth was not a defense to a
criminal action for libel. At the present time, however, in Eng-
land and in the great majority of American jurisdictions it is a
defense when published either for the public benefit or for good
motives and justifiable ends. In civil actions for libel truth is a
complete defense in England and in most states in this country
although in eleven states it is a defense only if the libel be pub-
lished for "justifiable ends.14 3
An objection to making truth a complete defense to an action
for libel is that the rule permits a defendant to publicize isolated
youthful lapses on the part of a person who, having long ago re-
pented and made amends, has properly acquired a good reputation
in the eyes of his fellow men. A pertinent example is the case of
a woman who, in her adolescence, bore an illegitimate child but
has since become a highly respected member of the community. For
this reason, some of the witnesses who appeared before the Com-
mittee on the Law of Defamation suggested that the rule of crimi-
nal libel be applied to a civil action and that truth should not
be available as a defense unless the defendant satisfied the court
not only that the statement alleged to be defamatory was true but
that it was also in the public interest that it be published. The
Committee rejected this suggestion on the ground that it would
place too great a burden upon the press to guess-and to guess
rightly-in advance whether a court would decide that the publi-
cation was in the public interest. This rationalization begs the
question for the press must make such a guess insofar as criminal
libel is concerned and even in civil actions if it plans to rely upon
the defense of fair comment. The conclusion is also rather hard
to reconcile with the Committee's cavalier rejection of the "prac-
tical" criticism that the law of defamation is unpredictable and with
42. Cases cited notes 33, 34, 35, supra.
43. Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 43 (1931).
44. Report, 1[ 78.
45. Report, 11117, 16.
1949]
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its great faith in the ability of the courts to prescribe the bounds of
permitted and proscribed speech.
4 5
Although in order to succeed in the defense of "justification"
it is only necessary to prove that the substance or sting of the
libel is true, this must be done in respect to each separate charge
contained in the libel, otherwise the defense fails.4 It may well be
that a libel contains a series of serious charges which the defendant
succeeds in proving up to the hilt and one, quite minor, charge
which he does not succeed in proving to be substantially true. In
such a case the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict and damages even
though the minor charge which is false can have caused no appre-
ciable damage to the plaintiff's reputation. The Committee recoi-
mends4 7 that the law be changed so as to allow a defendant to sue-
ceed in a defense of truth if he is able to prove that so substantial
a portion of the defamatory allegations are true as to lead the court
to believe that any remaining allegations not proven to be true
do not add "appreciably to the injury to the plaintiff's reputation."
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
Section 4 of the Law of Libel Amendment Act of 188841 grants
a qualified privilege to a fair and accurate report of certain govern-
mental proceedings. The privilege can be lost through malice and
the Act also provides that the defense shall not be available if the
defendant has refused or neglected to publish a reply requested
by the plaintiff by way of contradiction or explanation. The Cana-
dian Act 49 contains a similar provision but it also includes reports
that have been broadcast by radio and gives the plaintiff the right
to broadcast "a reasonable statement of explanation or contradic-
tion by or on behalf of the plaintiff on at least two occasions onl
different days and at the same time of day as the alleged defamatory
matter was broadcast or as near as possible to that time."
The Committee recommends9 that the categories of reports
entitled to the privilege of fair report be extended and that the
right of reply apply to most of the extensions.
Both the Canadian Act and the Committee's recommendation
constitute an endorsement in principle of the drott de r~ponse of
46. White v. White, 129 Va. 621, 106 S. E. 350 (1921) , Prosser. Hand-
book on Torts 855 (1941) , Report, IT 79.
47 Report, ff 82.
48. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64 (1888)
49. Alta. c. 14, § 10 (4) (1947) , Man. c. 11, § 10 (4) (1946)
50. Report, 1111 95-111.
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French law, a device that might well be considered as an alterna-
tive to an action for defamation."'
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
Inasmuch as injury to the plaintiff's reputation is an element
of "general damage" and a good reputation is presumed, the de-
fendant is allowed to meet the issue and prove, in mitigation of
damages, that the plaintiff's name was already tarnished.52 There
is no little dispute as to how far he can go in this endeavor. It is
almost universally admitted that he can submit in the form of
opinion evidence the plaintiff's general reputation in the com-
munity for the trait involved in the defanatory charge, e.g., honesty,
chastity. About half of the states confine the evidence to reputation
in respect to the particular trait; the others admit also evidence of
general reputation.5 3 How far the defendant may go in showing
particular incidents in the life of the plaintiff which are to his dis-
credit raises a more difficult question. On this point it is generally
accepted that on the issue of damages the plaintiff's record of par-
ticular indiscretions is not open to proof by the defendant. 4 The
reason for this view seems to be that evidence of particular mis-
conduct is irrelevant for it merely shows, in the neat phrase of
Mr. Justice Cave in Scott v. Sampson,55 "not that the plaintiff has
not, but that he ought not to have, a good reputation."
The Committee feels 56 that the doctrine of Scott v. Sampson
leads, in practice, -to inequitable results because, first, it is almost
impossible to find witnesses prepared to testify that the plaintiff
is of general bad reputation and as a consequence the rule may
operate so as to enable a notorious rogue to recover damages for
defamation. The Committee did not refer to any cases where this
has happened, however. It is also pointed out that the doctrine
has largely been nullified by the ordinary rule permtting a witness
to be cross-examined as to credibility. If the plaintiff takes the
stand he can be asked questions as to particular instances of mis-
51. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for
Libel, 34 Va. L. Rev. 867 (1948).
52. Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N. Y. 327, 150 N. E. 132
(1925) ; Carter, Defamation Actions 10, 32 (1946), in Practicing Law In-
stitute's Series on Trial Practice.
53. McCormick, Handbook on Damages 441 (1935), 1 Wigmore on
Evidence §§ 70-73 (3d ed. 1940).
54. McCormick, Handbook on Damages 443 (1935), I Wigmore on
Evidence § 209 (3d ed. 1940).
55. 8 Q. B. D. 491, 505 (1882).
56. Report, 1111 48-155.
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conduct, not for the purpose of mitigating damages but to question
his credibility The Committee thinks it inevitable that, if the jury
believes the plaintiff to have been guilty of acts of imprudence dis-
closed as a result of cross-examination as to credibility, tls belief
will be reflected in the amount of damages which they award. It
recommends,57 therefore, that the doctrine of Scott v. Sampson be
abrogated and that a defendant, upon giving due notice to the
plaintiff, be entitled to rely in mitigation of damages upon specific
instances of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff other than those
charged in the defamatory publication.
ROLLED-UP PLEA
Where a defamatory statement consists in part of allegations
of fact and in part of expressions of opinion, it has become a
common practice in England for defendants to utilize the so-called
"rolled-up plea." An example of this type of pleading is as
follows
"Insofar as the words complained of consist of statements of
fact, they are true in substance and in fact, and insofar as they
consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment made in
good faith and without malice upon the said facts, which are a
matter of public interest."
In the annals of a profession placing a premium upon equivo-
cation this gem of duplicity deserves a distinctive place. On its
face it is impossible for a plaintiff to determine what defense or
defenses will have to be met-a plea of justification, a plea of fair
comment, or both. In Sutherland v. Stopes,58 however, the plea was
treated as follows
"It has been sometimes treated as containing two separate
defenses rolled into one, but it in fact raises only one defense,
that being the defense of fair comment on matters of public interest.
The averment that the facts were truly stated is merely to lay the
necessary basis for the defense on the ground of fair comment."
But granting that the plea is one of fair comment only, there
is still considerable uncertainty as to the application of the defense
for the defendant has not specified which statements he alleges
to be factual and which are expressions of opinion. Consequently,
the plea is used instead of an ordinary plea of fair comment or
justification simply to avoid giving such particulars. Furthermore,
where the plea is used it is for the jury to determine at the trial
which of the words complained of are statements of fact and which
57 Report, f[ 156.
58. L. R. (1925) A. C. 47
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are expression of opinion. Consequently, the defendant cannot be
compelled to specify in his pleadings or by way of particulars
which statements are whlch. The Committee recommends" that
the plaintiff be entitled to a bill of particulars when confronted
with the "rolled-up plea."
The "rolled-up plea" has been used in this country, particu-
larly in New York where it has been held that it is for the jury
to distinguish between the statements of fact and those of opinion.00
A recent decision, however, has placed the whole question of the
rolled-up plea in confusion. In Foerster v. Flynn,0 ' the defendant
had interposed a rolled-up plea and the plaintiff filed a motion to
make more definite and certain. The court first pointed out the
difficulty of ascertaining just what the defense was to be and then
continued as follows:
"If this were an action in an English court the plaintiffs could
safely prepare their case on the theory that only the defense of
fair comment is involved. Since it is not, it would seem that good
pleading would require the -defendant to commit himself beyond
question to the particular defense which he wishes to assert. It
imposes no undue hardship to require the defendant, if he intends
to present a defense of fair comment rather than a defense of
justification, to make the choice in his pleadings."
The court then directed the defendant to serve a pleading
"(1) which separately states the defenses of justification and
fair comment, if both defenses are sought to be availed of by the
defendant; (2) with respect to the defense of fair comment, that
he specify whether the matters contained in paragraphs 5 through
38 constitute the underlying facts on which the comment is based,
(3) if he does not wish to confine himself to paragraphs 5 through
38 as constituting the underlying facts, he specify precisely what
facts he intends to assert defensively."
DEFAmATIOiN OF THE DEAD
Although nearly half of the states have statutes making it a
crime to "blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead,"0 2
59. Report, T I 173-177
60. Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N. Y. Supp.
340 (1929), Cohalan v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 Misc. 1061.
16 N. Y. S. 2d 706 (1939), Van Arsdale v. Time, Inc., 35 N. Y. S. 2d 951(1942), aff'd without opinion, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 413 (1942).
61. 84 N. Y. S. 2d 297 (Sup. Ct., Special Term, New York County,
Part 3, 1948).
62. The criminal statutes are collected in Armstrong, Nrothing But
Good of the Dead? 18 A. B. A. J. 229 (1932) and Wittenberg, Dangerous
Words 202 (1947). The quotation in the text is from the Kansas Statute
which is representative. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-2401 (1935).
The conviction under the Washington statute of a biographer of George
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
defamation of the memory of a deceased does not give rise to a
civil action by his personal representative or his surviving rela-
tives.63 The Committee on the Law of Defamation considered the
advisability of making a civil remedy available but decided against
it, giving both a legalistic and a policy reason for its decision. 4
Inasmuch as the basis of a civil proceeding for defamation is the
damage to the plaintiff's reputation the Committee could see no
logical basis for a proposal that the relatives of a deceased should
be entitled to bring an action for statements defamatory of the
deceased alone. Nor did it feel that there is any justification for
making such a remedy available to the personal representative
of the deceased since the estate is not normally damaged by de-
famatory statements. This latter observation seems to lose sight
of the point that it is not necessary to show damage in a libel action
or where the words are slanderous per se. Damage is presumed.
Washington was upheld in State v. Haffer, 94 Wash. 136, 162 Pac. 45 (1916)
Note, 19 A. L. R. 1517, 1520 (1922)
The criminal statutes have not been interpreted as giving rise to a
civil action for libel of the dead. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434,
160 S. W 2d 246 (1942), Hughes v New England Newspaper Publishing
Co., 312 Mass. 178, 43 N. E. 2d 657 (1942), Patterson v. Colgate, 129
Misc. 417, 220 N. Y. S. 677 (1926)
63. Sorensen v. Balaban, 11 App. Div. 164, 42 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1896)
Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 499, 79 N. W 122 (1899), Skrocki
v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957 (1910), Renfro Drug Co. v Lawson.
138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W 2d 246 (1942) , Turner v. Crime Detective, 34 F
Supp. 8 (N.D. Okla. 1940), Notes, 146 A. L. R. 739 (1943), 26 Corn. L. Q.
732 (1941), 19 Tex. L. Rev. 515 (1941), 19 Tex. L. Rev. 101 (1940) , 25
Minn. L. Rev. 243 (1941) , 40 Col. L. Rev. 1267 (1940) , Restatement.
Torts § 560 (1938).
The Roman, French, and German codes all recognize libel of the (lead
as a legal wrong and permit recovery in a civil action. Note, 26 Corn. L. Q.
732 (1941)
Under the doctrine that the publication of a statement concerning A
may be of such a character as to defame B, relatives of a deceased have
attempted to bring suit in their own right. But mere relationship to the
deceased is not enough and in order for the suit to be maintained it must
appear that the defamatory statement "directly" reflects upon the deceascd's
relatives who are suing in their own right. Rose v. Daily Mirror. 284 N. Y
335, 31 N. E. 2d 182 (1940), noted in 26 Corn. L. Q. 732 (1941), 40 Col.
L. Rev. 1267 (1940), and 19 Tex. L. Rev. 515 (1941), Wellman v. Sun
Printing and Publishing Association, 66 Hun 331, 21 N. Y Supp. 577 (1892)
Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App. 732, 202 Pac. 887 (1921) See Note, 132
A. L. R. 891 (1941)
A false obituary notice is not considered libelous but only an exaggera-
tion. Cohen v. New York Times Pub. Co., 153 App. Div. 242, 138 N. Y Supp.
206 (1912), Ross v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 174 Misc. 1019, 22
N. Y. S. 2d 519 (1940) , Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 190 Misc. 730,
75 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (1947) However, such a notice may be defamatory if it
includes a statement that death occurred under disgraceful circumstances.
Quinn v. Sun Printing and Publishing Co., 55 Misc. 572, 105 N. Y. Supp. 680
1092 (1907) , Dal v Time, Inc., 252 App. Div 636, 300 N. Y Supp. 680
(1937), aff'd, 278 N. Y. 635, 16 N. E. 2d 297 (1938)
64. Report, fff[ 27-29.
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From the standpoint of public policy the Committee thought that
historical research would be unduly arrested if historians and
biographers were put to strict proof of the statements contained
in their writings. "If those engaged in writing history were com-
pelled, for fear of proceedings for libel, to limit themselves to events
of which they could provide proof acceptable to a Court of law,
records of the past would, we think, be unduly and undesirably
curtailed."8 15 This argument is not only a reflection upon the
quality of historical research but overlooks the fact that defenses
of justification and fair comment can be preserved. Even if we
agree with the cynic that history is but the "distillation of rumor"
it is questionable whether history and biography are so much more
vital than contemporary news reporting that defamation in the
former case should be excused and not in the latter, particularly
since some writers seem purposely to save their vitriol until the
death of their antagonist. Furthermore, in contemporary society,
family prestige and reputation unfortunately have considerable
bearing on social, economic and political opportunities. It would
seem that a carefully drawn statute limiting the right to maintain
a civil action to those so closely related to the deceased as likely
to be adversely affected by the defamation would be advisable pro-
viding wide latitude is given to the defenses of justification and
fair comment86
GROUP DEFAmATION
It has been convincingly demonstrated that defamation and the
law of defamation were important factors in the struggle between
democracy and fascism; that they were used by the Fascists and
Nazis as major political weapons."- Defamation of opponents is one
of the standard devices of political propaganda, serving a two-
fold purpose: (1) Providing scapegoats for all troubles and (2)
serving to build and unify an anti-democratic group. If suits are
brought against the defamers the court room is used as an arena
for further vilification and abuse, the vilifiers cravenly hiding behind
the cloak of privilege.88 Political defamation has been directed
particularly against minority religious and racial groups which
receive little protection against this type of abuse by the criminal
65. Report, 29.
66. Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. 1267 (1940).
67 Reisman, Democracy and Defamation, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727, 1085,
1282 (1942), Loewenstem, Legislative Control of Political Extremism it
European Democracies, 38 Col. L. Rev. 591, 727 (1938).
68. See note 67 supra. For a similar abuse of the judicial privilege in
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law 9 and a civil remedy for group defamation is usually denied
for the reason that the defamation is not "of and concerning the
plaintiff. ' 70 Consequently an impersonal reproach of an indeter-
minate class is not actionable.
In 1935, New Jersey enacted a statute 7' making guilty of a
misdemeanor
"Any person who shall print, write, multigraph or in any man-
ner whatever make or produce any book, speech, article, state-
ment, circular or pamphlet which in any way, in any part thereof,
incites, counsels, promotes, or advocates hatred, abuse, violence or
hostility against any group or group of persons residing or being
in this State, by reason of race, color, religious, or manner of
worship."
The statute was promptly held unconstitutional on the ground
that the terms "hatred, abuse, violence or hostility" are abstract,
vague, indefinite and uncertain. 7 2
this country see Gordon, Fascist Field Day in Chicago, 166 The Nation, No.
4, Jan. 24, 1948, p. 98. The current Communist trials in New York and the
Kravchenko libel suit in Paris have been utilized by the Communists as
vehicles for advancing their ideologies. For an account of the former see
N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1949, § 4, p. 2, col. 7 A report of the Kravclienko
trial states that the trial turned into a "public debate over the merits and
defects of both Mr. Kravchenko and the Communist system." N. Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1949, § 4, p. 5, col. 8.
It has been the legislative privilege that has afforded the most oppor-
tunities for political defamation in this country. Ogden, The Dies Committee
(1945), Gellermann, Martin Dies (1944), Gellhorn, Report on a Report
of the House Committee on Un-Anercan Activities, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1193
(1947).
69. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (1938)
Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 Col. L. Rev. 595
(1947), Chaffee, Government and Mass Communications 116-130 (1947)
Wittenberg, Dangerous Words 223-264 (1947)
70. Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93, 200 N. E. 592 (1936), holding "an iiii-
personal reproach of an indeterminate class is not actionable" because not
published "of and concerning the plaintiff."
A magazine article defaming District of Columbia taxicab drivers as a
group does not give rise to a cause of action by individual taxi drivers.
Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F Supp. 303 (D. D.C. 1948), Peay v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 78 F Supp. 305 (D. D.C. 1948).
See generally, Wilner, The Civil Liability Aspects of Dclamation
Directed against a Collectivity, 90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 414 (1942)
71. N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2:157 B-5 (1939). Also see Mass. Ann. Laws.
c. 272, § 98C (enacted in 1943) extending criminal libel to include "false"
material published "with intent to maliciously promote hatred of any group
of persons in the commonwealth because of race, color or religion."
In 1947, Indiana enacted an "Anti-Hate Law" whose policy was de-
clared to be to "prevent racketeering in hatred" by reason of race, color or
religion. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-904-10-914 (Burns, Supp. 1947) For aIn
excellent discussion of this far reaching statute see Wampler, The "Ainti-
Hate" Act, 22 Ind. L. J. 295 (1947)
72. State v. Klapprott, 127 N. J. L. 395. 401, 402. 22 A. 2d 877. 881
(1941), "That the terms 'hatred,' 'abuse.' 'hostility,' are abstract and in-
definite admits of no contradiction. When do they arise? Is it to be left to
a jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt when the emotion of hatred or
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Another objection to statutes punishing group defamation is
that they would curtail free and frank political discussion and it
is for this reason that the Committee on the Law of Defamation
opposes any change in the existing law of England." This threat
to freedom of expression was admirably spelled out by Judge
Wallace in a decision holding that a libel against "all persons of
the Jewish religion" was not indictable :-4
"As is so well pointed out in the briefs submitted by amicus
curiae, it is wiser to bear with this sort of scandal-mongering rather
than to extend the criminal law so that in the future it might
become an instrument of oppression. We must suffer the dema-
gogue and the charlatan, in order to make certain that we do not
limit or restrain the honest commentator on public affairs.
And when one realizes how many forms of religion might con-
sider themselves libeled and seek legal redress, were our laws so
extended, and when we reflect on how our courts might, in such
event, find themselves forced into the position of arbiters of
religious truth, it is apparent that more would be lost than could
be gained by attempting to protect the good name of a religion by
an appeal to the criminal law."
hostility is aroused in the mind of the listener as a result of what a speaker
has said? Nothing m our crminal law can be invoked to justify so wide a
discretion. The Criminal Code must be definite and informative so that
there may be no doubt in the mind of the citizenry that the interdicted act or
conduct is illicit!'
Cf., Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
73. Report, 111[ 30-32.
74. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (1938).
In this case the American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities,
the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the
American Civil Liberties Umon, and the Human Relations Committee of
the National Council of Women, all filed briefs amicus curiae and, while
denouncing the conduct of the defendant, nevertheless contended that the
safeguarding of free speech, free press, and religious liberty made it de-
sirable that the indictment be dismissed.
The American Jewish Congress has apparently reversed its position
for it was instrumental in having introduced in the 81st Congress several
bills which would make it a federal crime "knowingly to bring or cause to
be brought into the United States . or to send by common carrier or
other agency, or to deposit or cause to be deposited in the United States
mails for mailing and delivery . any publication or material . con-
taming any statement concerning any person, persons or group of persons
designating, identifying, or characterizing him or them directly or indirectly
by reference to his or their race or religion, which exposes or tends to expose
him or them to hatred, contempt, or obloquy or cause or tends to cause him
or them to be shunned or avoided or to be injured in his or their business
or occupation." See H. R. 2270, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), introduced by
Representative Klein and H. R. 22-72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), intro-
duced by Representative Keating. For the attitude of the American Jewish
Congress see the letter to the editor of the New York Times from Mr.
Joachim Prinz, Chairman of its Administrative Committee. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1949, p. 22, col. 7, reprinted in 95 Cong. Rec. A 857 (Feb. 15, 1949).
For an acute criticism of a similar bill introduced in the 80th Congress by
Representative Dickstein see Chafee, Government and Mass Communica-
tions 117, 125 (1947).
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In this country the Commission on Freedom of the Press is
unanimously opposed to the enactment of group defamation legis-
lation on the grounds that laws of this type would discourage free
and open discussion, would probably be unconstitutional, would
increase dissention between groups, and that group vilification is a
symptom of evils whose cure must be sought outside the law 75
In reply to the views of the Committee on the Law of Defania-
tion and the Commission on Freedom of the Press it can be argued
that the enactment of legislation is itself an educational process.
Furthermore, the objective of group defamation is obviously the
furtherance of anti-democratic ideas through attack on minority
groups whose ability to defend themselves effectively is limited. It
is this inequality in obtaining access to the channels of communica-
tion that prevents the free interplay of ideas and points of view so
essential to the realization of the ideals enshrined in the First
Amendment. The enactment of narrowly drawn statutes outlawing
such an admitted social evil as group defamation of racial and
religious minorities would not necessarily be attended by the
danger of legislative curtailment of free expression for less desirable
ends."8
THE CHAIN LIBEL SuIT
The newspapers of the period during which many of the doc-
trines of libel law were being formulated had comparatively small
circulations. The wide audience reached by the modern newspaper,
the development of state, national, and international news coverage
through the press associations and the furnishing of feature news
articles, pictures, and interpretative articles by feature syndicates,
have given a new aspect to the protection of reputation. On the
other hand, it is no longer possible for the newspaper editor to
supervise personally every news story, article, picture, cartoon, or
comment used in the columns of his publication, and, if lie could
do so, it would hardly be possible for him to know, under all cir-
75. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 129 (1947) , Note,
Freedom of Speech and Group Libel Statutes, 1 Bill of Rights Review 221
(1941)
As underlining the viewpoint that the cure for prejudice is without the
realm of law see the symposium on "Controlling Group Prejudice" in the
Annals, Vol. 244, particularly, Lippitt & Radke, New Trends in the In-
vestigation of Prejudice, 244 Annals 167 (1946).
76. See the suggested statute in the excellent note entitled Statutory
Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 Col L. Rev. 595 (1947).
While the Canadian Uniform Act is silent on the subject of group de-
famation, Manitoba law provides that the circulation of a libel against a




cumstances, whether libel is involved. Nonetheless, as we have
seen, a defendant publishes a libel at his peril unless he can estab-
lish the narrow defense of privilege. The other media of commun-
cation such as radio and motion pictures with their vast and far
flung audiences make the dissemination of defamation as poten-
tially harmful to the defamed person's reputation as a newspaper
publication.7 7
The development of mass methods of communication has made
possible the chain libel suit with manifold liabilities for publishers.-5
The problems are raised by two recent cases. On December 23,
1941, the United Feature Syndicate distributed the column called
"Vashington Merry-Go-Round" to some three hundred newspapers
having a readership of about twelve million persons. The article
charged Representative Martin L. Sweeney with opposing the
appointment of a Federal District Judge for the reason that the
latter was a Jew. Congressman Sweeney brought some sixty-eight
lawsuits, blanketing the United States, in which he demanded
damages in an aggregate of approximately $7,500,000." The other
77. The week-day circulation of the New York News in 1947 was
2,402,346, the Sunday circulation 4,716,807, that of the Chicago Tribune wvas
1,031,851 and 1,544,770; the New York Times, 543,000 and 1,092,054, the
Los Angeles Examiner, 409,995 and 860,124. The best source of statistical
information on the newspaper industry is Editor and Publisher, International
Yearbook, Jan. 31, 1949.
The audience of a radio broadcast might, in its geographical area, cover
the world. Single special feature radio programs have reached as many as
one hundred million people. Regularly, some of the more popular programs
reach up to twenty-five million listeners. Wittenberg, Dangerous Words
265-81 (1947). 98yo of the people of the United States are withi range of
at least one of the more than 2500 AM, FM and TV operating stations.
White, The American Radio 204 (1947), Broadcasting-Telecasting Year-
book 21 (1949). Approximately four-fifths of the country's homes-37
million-are eqipped with radios. Broadcasting-Telecasting Yearbook 18(1949). As of January 1, 1949, approximately 1100 of the radio stations on
-the air were affiliated with the major networks. Broadcasting-Telecasting
Yearbook 21 (1949).
For the economic structure of the movie industry see. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, (1948), Inglis, Freedom of the
Movies (1947). For a recent libel suit arising out of the movie "They Were
Expendable" see Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F Supp. 473 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
78. Probably the first successful chain libel plaintiff was Annie Oakley
who won 48 suits against 50 different newspapers, the damages awarded
ranging from $500 to as high as $27,500, Ernst and Lindey, Hold Your Tongue
239 (1932), Butler v. Hoboken Prirting and Pub. Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 ,\tl.
272 (Sup. Ct 1905).
79. A partial list of the reported cases is as follows Sweeney Y.
Newspaper Printing Corp., 177 Tenn. 196, 147 S. W 2d 406 (1941).
Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Pub. Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N. E. 2d 471
(1941), Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F 2d 457 (App. D.C. 1942), Sweeney
v. Capital News Pub.-Co., 37 F Supp. 355 (D.C. Idaho 1941), Sweeney v.
Caller-Times Pub. Co., 41 F Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex. 1941), Sweeney v.
Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F 2d 53 (3d Cir. 1942), Sweeney v. United
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
situation is presented by the case of Hartmann v. Time, Inc.,'"
where Life magazine, in an issue of more than 3,900,000 copies, was
alleged to have printed an article defamatory of the plaintiff. It
should be noted that in the Sweeney cases the law suits were
brought against different newspapers which carried the offending
column while in the Hartmann case only one publication-Life-
carried the article.
At common law every publication was said to give rise to a
separate and distinct cause of action. Therefore, each time a news-
paper or magazine containing libelous material was sold a new
publication resulted and a fresh tort was committed.81 If this doc-
trine were applied in strictness to the Hartmann case, nearly four
million separate causes of action arose, for Hartmann would have
had, in theory, as many causes of action as there were issues of the
publication containing the libelous matter in as many places as the
publication occurred.82 This "multiple publication" rule had its
origin in an era which -hardly contemplated today's rapid dis-
semiation of printed material to thousands of readers through-
out the country by a single though complex mass distribution
process, nor did its creators envisage the simultaneous publica-
tion to a vast radio audience by a single utterance. Some courts,
to meet the needs created by modern methods of communication
and believing the common law rule unsuitable, have evolved a
"single publication" rule whereby all the congeries of acts in-
volved in the economic process of getting the one issue of printed
matter from the printer to the many readers are regarded as a
single act of publication. Thus, if the economic process of "publica-
Feature Syndicate, 129 F 2d 904 (2d Cir. 1942), Sweeney v. Schenectady
Union Pub. Co., 122 F 2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941) affirmed by an equally divided
court, 316 U. S. 642 (1942), Sweeney v. Buffalo Courier Express, 35 F
Supp. 446 (W.D. N.Y. 1940), Syeeney v. Chronicle News Publishing Co.,
126 F 2d 53 (3d Cir. 1942).
Drew Pearson's "Merry-Go-Round," which provoked the Sweeney
suits, now appears in 600 newspapers which have a combined circulation of
20 million and his Sunday night broadcast over the American Broadcasting
Company's network reaches an estimated 10 million people. Time, Dec. 13,
1948, p. 70, col. 2.
80. 166 F 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838.
81. Cook v. Conners, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78 (1915), Underwood
v. Smith, 93 Tenn. 687, 27 S. W 1008 (1894) , Restatement, Torts § 578,
comment b (1934).
82. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344
(1943) , Hartman v. American News Co., 69 F Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1947) ,
O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940) , Julian
v. Kansas City Star, 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W 496 (1907), Note, I A. L. R.
2d 384, 389 (1948).
83. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. demcd,
334 U. S. 838 (1948), Backus v. Look, 39 F Supp. 662 (S.D. N.Y. 1941),
Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) , Campbell-Johnson
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tion" is confined to only one state, there is but one cause of action
regardless of a circulation running into the millions, the extent
of the circulation going only to the question- of damages. Neither
the Canadian Defamation Act nor the Report of the Committee on
the Law of Defamation make any reference to this question of
"multiple publication" versus "single publication," an omission
difficult to understand in view of the importance of the problem.
In support of the "multiple publication" rule it can be argued
that periodicals and newspapers should be held responsible for
abuses of the right of free press, that the risk of libel is a cal-
culated risk which defendants are better able to undertake than
the average plaintiff. On the other hand, the "single publication"
rule eliminates possible harassing suits and results in simplification
of judicial administration.
Consistent with the multiple publication rule is the principle
that the defendant is not permitted to apprise the jury that the
plaintiff may have an opportunity to seek reimbursement from
others who have participated in the wrong or that other suits have
been or are being brought against lum by the same plaintiff. It
is said that the defendant is adequately protected by an instruc-
tion that the jury can assess damages only for the harm done by
the defendant's particular publication."' Nor do the decisions per-
mit the defendant to show that the plaintiff has actually obtained
a judgment against other circulators of the libel.65 This rule was
changed in England by the Law of Libel Amendment Act in
188886 with respect to libels contained in "newspapers" and the
Committee on the Law of Defamation87 recommends that in any
v- Liberty Magazine, Inc., 4 N. Y. S. 2d 659 (1945), Wolfson v. Syracuse
Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938).
aff'd, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d 676 (1938), 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 658
(1939) ; Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193(1921) ; Note, 1 A. L. R. 2d 384, 389 (1948).
The "single publication" rule has recently been applied by a closely
divided court to books as 'well as newspapers and magazines. Gregoire v.
G. P Putnam's Sons, Books, Inc., 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948) noted,
47 Mich. L. Rev. 429 (1949), reverming, 272 App. Div. 591, 74 N. Y. S. 2d
238 (1st Dep't 1948), noted, 48 Col. L. Rev. 475 (1948), 23 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 344 (1948).
84. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n v. Schenck, 98 Fed. 925 (2d
Cir. 1900), Vragg v. Hammack, 155 Va. 419, 155 S. E. 683 (1930) ; Norfolk
Post Corp. v. Wright, 140 Va. 735, 125 S. E. 656 (1924), McCormick,
Handbook on Damages 441 (1935).
85. Fay v. Brockway Co., 176 App. Div. 255, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1030
(1st Dep't 1917) ; Butler v. Hoboken Printing &-Publishing Co., 73 N. J. L.
45, 62 AtI. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1905), Palmer v. Matthews, 162 N. Y. 100, 56
N. E. 501 (1900).
86. 51 &52Vict.c. 64, § 6 (1888).
87 Report, 1'142-145.
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action for defamation, whether or not the matter complained of
was published in a newspaper, the defendant be entitled to give
evidence in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff has recovered
or brought other actions for damages or has recovered or agreed
to accept compensation in respect to any defamatory statement "to
the same purport or effect as the defamatory statement for whiich
such action has been brought." The Canadian Act s8 has a similar
provision, but New York89 and Massachusetts 0 appear to be the
only states in this country having provisions of this type.
A defamatory communication which reaches more than one state
raises an involved conflict of laws problem as to the choice-of-law "'
Usually this issue is not considered by the court and only recently
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circtit referred to it
as a "novel problem. ' 92 The problem becomes more complex when
the communication reaches several states some of which follow
the multiple publication rule and others the single publication
rule.93 Judge Wyzanski, in a recent movie case,"' referred to the
intricacies of the situation as follows
"It complaint had been made of showing not only in Iassa-
chusetts, but elsewhere, the Massachusetts court would have bein
clearly faced with the need of determining whether to regard tle
conduct complained of as a single tort or as multiple torts
If it took the single tort view the Massachusetts court would
88. Alta. c. 14,§ 16(2) (1947), Man-c. 11, § 16(2) (1946)
89. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 338a.
90. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 94 (1933), which provides "In ain
action for libel, the defendant may allege and prove in mitigation of damages
that the plaintiff already has brought action for or recovered damages for,
or has received or has agreed to receive compensation in respect of. sub-
stantially the same libel as that for which such action was brought. "
91. Notes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1947) , 48 Col. L. Rev. 475 (19,18)
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1460 (1948) , 16 U. of Cli. L. Rev. 164 (1948) , 43 Ill. I.
Rev. 556 (1948)
92. Christopher v American News Co., 171 F 2d 275, 281 (7th Cir.
1948)
93. This was the situation in Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F 2d 127
(3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948). The stilt was origially
brought in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
the district court held that there was but a single cause of action-applying
the single publication rule-which was barred by the Pennsylvaia statute
of limitations. Upon appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the
decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The circuit court deter-
mined that Pennsylvania follows the single publication rule and that the
"single" cause of action arose in Illinois where the publication first took
place. It therefore held that the Illinois cause of action "engrossed" the
harm done in all states following the "single publication" rule and that tls
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court added,
however, that the district court should have respected the laws of the states
following the multiple publication rule and that the plaintiff could maintain
an action in the district court based on publications in states following the
multiple publication doctrine.
94. Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F Supp. 473, 482, 484 (D. Mass. 19,18)
DEFAMATION
presumably regard as 'the publication' not the circulation of the
script (which admittedly differed from the movie), nor the cir-
culation of the 'continuity' of the film, nor the first showing of the
picture to producer's employees, but rather the first showing of the
picture to the public. Then the Massachusetts court would have
to determine whether the law to be applied to that 'publication'
was the law of the place of production, or the law of the place of the
first showing of the film to the general public, or the law of the
place where plaintiff enjoyed his principal reputation, or some
other law ...
But decision on those implications should await an appropriate
case. Before that case arises the problem may be dealt with by
local or federal statute."
There is an imperative need for uniformity in this field which
might be achieved through federal legislation 5 or by means of a
Uniform Act.
CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that the Report of the Committee on the
Law of Defamation has received a favorable press for its recom-
mendations are, for the most part, to the advantage of prospective
libel defendants of whom the press forms the great majority The
law of defamation has emerged from its trial, if not unscathed, at
all events substantially vindicated as a just and reasonable body
of judge-made rules, all founded upon principles which are not to
be cast aside even though their precise application may be modi-
fied.96 When we criticize the law, consciously or unconsciously
we adopt standards of value, for our conception of the purpose of any
particular branch of the law determines the angle from which it is
viewed. The failure of the committee to take a bolder line was
perhaps due to several "inarticulate major premises." English
libel plaintiffs probably win verdicts more often than they do in
this country and it is certain that they obtain much higher ver-
dicts.97 The Committee frankly admitted that most of the witnesses
who appeared before it represented interests whose businesses
were such as to expose them to the risk of libel and whose ex-
95. Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 951 (1948). As to the consutuuonality
of federal legislation on the subject of defamation consult, Donnelly, supra
note 6, at 33-37
96. For discussions of the Report in the English journals consult,
Faulks, Report of the Committee oa; Defamation, 98 L. J. 611 (Nov. 5, 1948),
N. C. B., Report on The Law of Defamation, 92 Sol. J. 610 (Oct. 30, 1948),
Id., 626 (Nov. 6, 1948).
97 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 103 (1947), Rics-
man, supra note 67, at 1117
Bills for the reform of the law of defamation to the advantage of the
press were introduced in Parliament by Lord Brougham in 1816. by Lord
Campbell in 1843; and by the Press Union in 1938. All failed of passage.
Prosser, Handbook on Torts 808 (1941), Paton, stpra note 6.
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perience with the law of defamation had been almost exclusively in
the role of defendants. 9s
Except for an adumbrative solicitude for the press it does not
appear that the committee had any real frame of reference against
which the existing law of defamation was to be measured. Lacking
a philosophy its efforts were without direction. It paid lip-service to
the general criticisms of the law of defamation which it sum-
marized as follows (1) unnecessarily complicated, (2) unduly
costly, (3) such as to make it difficult to forecast the result of
an action both as to liability and as to the measure of damages,
(4) liable to stifle discussion upon matters of public interest and
concern, (5) too severe upon a defendant who is innocent of any
intention to defame, and (6) too favorable to "gold-digging"
plaintiffs. It then dismissed them as "practical rather than scien-
tific", that, if true, they are not peculiar to the law of defamation
but represent the natural reaction of the layman when brought
into personal contact with the English legal procedure?"9 Yet the
committee did not hesitate to resort to the "practical" in justify-
ing its recommendations that radio defamation be classified as
libel, that the doctrine of Scott v. Sampson be abolished, and that
the "rolled-up plea" be made vulnerable to a bill of particulars.
The Committee opposed general codification of the law of defama-
tion on the ground that it is desirable to retain flexibility and
give wide latitude to judges and juries, within the framework of
judge-made rules, to deal with the varied and diverse problems
which claims for libel and slander provide. °00 All in all the report
smacks of a rigid professionalism which shuns attempts to knife
through the facade of legal jargon on which pure professionalism
as a priestly cult thrives.
Every state in the United States and the District of Colum-
bia have legislated on the subject of libel and slander but the legis-
lation has not dealt with the field as a whole.10' It has been sporadic
and piecemeal.
Although the Commission on Freedom of the Press considered
the law of libel in the broad context of freedom of the press, there
appears to have been no thorough and exhaustive study of the
law of defamation in this country The Restatement of Torts, not
being concerned with reform, has done little more than preserve
98. Report, ff 5.
99. Report, ']I 6, 7
100. Report, l'i 16-18.
101. The statutes are collected in Arthur and Crosman, The Law of
Newspapers 500-578 (1940) and Angoff, Handbook of Libel (1946)
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the existing befuddlement and, at least in one instance, has re-
tarded further study and research. For example, in 1942 the Judi-
cial Council of Massachusetts reported adversely to a suggestion
that the law of libel be codified. Referring to the Restatement of
Torts and its chapter on defamation, the report concluded that 0
"The law of Massachusetts except as modified by statute, is
substantially in accord with the principles laid down in the 'Restate-
ment', and with certain specific changes such as we recommend in
this report, may be left for study in the 'Restatement' It is a
mistake to pile up 'codifications' at public expense where they are
not needed. It simply means more printing of words for lawyers
to disagree about, added to the present enormous volume of litera-
ture of the law."
The Committee on the Law of Defamation was appointed to
"consider the Law of Defamation and to report on the changes in
the existing law, practice and procedure relating to the matter which
are desirable."'' 0 3 A similar study and report by a group of com-
petent scholars would seem to be important in this country. The
problems considered by the English committee would certainly need
examination in the light of their operation here. But in addition
to these such a group might properly consider the problem of the
chain libel suit which is of particular importance in view of the
modern methods of mass commumcaton. Solution of this prob-
lem seems to require either a uniform act or federal legislation.
A study of the law of defamation need not limit itself to pro-
posals for an internal renovation of the law, but should consider the
advisability of new and supplementary remedies such as the "Right
of Reply." 104
And finally, since the law of defamation is a form of govern-
ment control over freedom of expression, a realistic study of this
field should consider its relation to and effect upon the ideals of
freedom of the press enshrined in the First Amendment for
"whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
free debate."' 0 5
102. Eighteenth Report of Judicial Council of Massachusetts, p. 56
(1942), reprinted in 28 Mass. L. Q. 56 (1943).
103. Report, f[ 1.
104. Consult, Donnelly, mupra note 51, at 884.
105. See Edgerton, J., in Sweeney v. Patterson, 76 App. D. C. 23, 24,
128 F 2d 457,458 (App. D.C. 1942).
For provocative discussions of the relationship between defamation and
freedom of expression, consult, Chafee, Government and Mass Communica-
tions 77 (1947); Dawson, Freedom of the Press (1924), Thayer, Legal
Control of the Press 26-39 (1944), Hall, Presernng Liberty of the Press
by the Defense of Privilege in Libel Actions, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 226 (1928),
Veeder, Freedom. of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1910), Ries-
man, supra note 67, at 1282, 1285.
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